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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
J. LAMAR RICHARDS and 
LYNN P. RICHARDS, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents 
vs . 
.JOHN VA TSIS, 
Defendant and Appellant 
Case No. 
10049 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for damages arising from Defend-
ant's breach of contract, entered into between Plaintiffs 
and Defendant, for the sale of Plaintiffs' home to 
Defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court. From a judgment 
for the Plaintiffs, Defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment and 
judgment in his favor as a matter of law, or that failing 
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a modification as to the measure and amount of damages 
awarded to Plaintiffs. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
For the purpose of convenience and clarity the parties 
will be referred to as they appeared in trial and reference 
to the record will be designated by (R-1). 
On October 9th, 1962, Plaintiffs, J. LAMAR 
RICHARDS and LYNN P. RICHARDS, entered into 
an earnest money agreement with JOHN V ATSIS, 
Defendant, for the sale of Plaintiffs' home to the 
Defendant. The earnest money agreement recited the 
total sale price of Twenty-nine Thousand Seven Hundred 
Fifty Dollars ( $29,7 50) , and a Deposit of Three Hundred 
Fifty Dollars ( $350), the receipt of which sum was 
acknowledged by the Plaintiffs. Prior to the date of 
October 9th, 1962, the date of the contract in question, 
the Plaintiffs and Defendant had entered into a prior 
earnest money agreement for the sale and purchase of 
the Plaintiffs' home, but the prior contract was not acted 
upon and the second contract, which is in issue~ was 
entered into. 
The Defendant, however, paid to Plaintiffs, through 
their agent, the Mt. Olympus Realty, the sum of One 
Hundred Dollars ($100) on the first contract. When the 
second contract, dated October 9th, 1962, was entered 
into, Plaintiffs, through their agent, Mt. Olympus Realty, 
agreed to credit the One Hundred Dollars ($100) paid 
by. Defendant on the prior contract towards the earnest 
money on the second contract, and Defendant thereby 
issued a check in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty 
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Dollars ( $250) , making the total amount deposited Three 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ( $350), as indicated on the earnest 
money agreement. Thereafter, due to dissatisfaction, the 
Defendant placed a stop-payment order on the check for 
Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ( $250) issued to Plaintiffs. 
The amount of One Hundred Dollars ( $100) credited 
to Defendant as partial payment of the earnest money 
agreement sued upon, was never returned or tendered 
to the Defendant prior to the initiation of this action. 
Plaintiffs brought action for damages for breach of con-
tract. The Defendant at the time of pre-trial raised as 
an additional defense the fact that no return or tender 
of return had been made of the One Hundred Dollars 
( $100) credited as payment by Defendant and retained 
by the Plaintiffs and the Plaintiffs thereby exercised their 
right under the liquidated damage provision of the con-
tract and were barred from suing for damages (R-22). 
The only real issues for determination at trial were 
whether the Defendant in fact paid anything on the 
second earnest money agreement and if so, whether 
Plaintiffs were obligated to return or tender the return 
of such sums paid by Defendant before initiating suit. 
At trial, Russell Pugh, salesman for the Mt. Olympus 
Realty, testified that he in fact, credited the Defendant 
with payment of One Hundred Dollars ($100) towards 
the total amount of Three Hundred Fifty Dollars ($350), 
earnest money, and accepted the check of Two Hundred 
Fifty Dollars ($250), making a total of Three Hundred 
Fifty Dollars ($350) paid by the Defendant (R-91-92). 
The trial court found, inter aliaJ that the Defendant 
paid nothing on the earnest money agreement sued upon, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
and the court consequently rendered judgment for the 
Plaintiffs in the amount of Two Thousand Dollars 
( $2,000), which represents the difference between the 
contract price and the price of the subsequent sale of 
Plaintiffs' home to a third party. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
FINDING THAT ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS 
($100) WAS NOT PAID BY THE DEFENDANT 
ON THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT OF 
OCTOBER 9, 1962. 
Paragraph Three of the Court's finding of Fact, 
(R-47) reads: 
"That the defendant was to pay the Plaintiffs 
Three hundred fifty Dollars ( $350) as earnest 
money under the terms of the October 9th, 1962, 
agreement but instead of making the Three Hun-
dred Fifty Dollar ( $350) payment Defendant 
issued, or caused to be issued, a check for only 
Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250) and requested 
the real estate agent to credit to the Defendant 
One Hundred Dollars ($100) which Defendant 
had paid to Plaintiff under a separate and prior 
agreement, and which One Hundred Dollars 
( $100) the Defendant admitted was the Plain-
tiffs', due to Defendant's admitted breach of the 
prior, separate agreement." 
The most careful scrutiny of the records and the 
transcript of trial does not support the Court's findings 
as indicated above but, in fact, contradicts this ruling. The 
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rfcord is devoid of any indications which would lead one 
to believe that Defendant admitted that the One Hun-
dred Dollars ( $100) in question was the Plaintiffs', due 
on the breach of the prior contract. On the contrary, the 
Defendant, throughout the trial, insisted and proved that 
the One Hundred Dollars ($100) in question was to be 
applied as partial payment of the initial deposit on the 
second contract. 
As the record clearly shows, the Mt. Olympus Realty 
Company was engaged by the Plaintiffs to sell Plaintiffs' 
home. Russell Pugh was an employee of the Mt. Olympus 
Realty Company. At trial, he testified that he received 
from Defendant the amount of One Hundred Dollars 
( $100) on a prior contract between the parties and 
placed that amount in the trust account of his company. 
The prior contract was not acted upon by either parties. 
(R-91-93) Mr. Pugh further testified that in negotiating 
the terms of the second earnest money contract, the One 
hundred Dollars ( $100) received from the Defendant and 
deposited in the company's trust account was to be 
credited towards the Three Hundred Fifty Dollars ( $350) 
earnest money agreed upon and that he specifically ad-
vised the Defendant that this was being done. Mr. Pugh 
testified as follows : 
Q. You testified that there was One Hundred 
Dollars ( $100) in a trust account with your 
company belonging to this Defendant, is that 
correct? 
A. To the best of my knowledge, I turned in One 
Hundred Dollars ($100) to the company, and 
I assume it went in the trust account. 
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Q. What was your understanding of the disposi-
tion of the One Hundred Dollars ( $100) ? 
A. I really had no understanding to the disposi-
tion; it had to remain in the trust account, to 
the best of my knowledge. 
Q. What I meant, Mr. Pugh, what did you un-
derstand was to be done with this One Hun-
dred Dollars ( $100) ? 
A. At what time? 
Q. At the time of the execution of the October 
9th contract. 
A. On that day, I, in fact, credited that amount 
and included it with the Two Hundred Fifty 
($250) Mr. Vatsis had given me at that time 
to make the total down payment of Three 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ( $350) . 
Q. Did you indicate that to Mr. Vatsis? 
A. Yes. (R-91-92). 
Nothing in the record and nothing at trial rebutts the 
fact that One Hundred Dollars ( $100) was credited to 
the Defendant as payment towards the initial deposit of 
Three Hundred Fifty Dollars ( $350) on the earnest 
money agreement. Yet the trial court found that nothing 
was paid as down payment on the contract of October 
9th, 1962. In fact nothing was paid or credited towards 
payment on the second contract, the check which was 
issued by Defendant would have been Three Hundred 
Fifty Dollars ($350) instead of Two Hundred Fifty 
Dollars ($250). 
The evidence clearly indicates that One Hundred 
Dollars ( $100) was, in fact, credited as payment from 
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Defendant to Plaintiffs' agent, Mt. Olympus Realty and 
the trial court erred in finding otherwise. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
GRANTING JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFFS. 
The primary question at this juncture is whether or 
not the Plaintiffs may sue for damages on the earnest 
money contract of October 9th, notwithstanding the fact 
that One Hundred Dollars ( $100) of the down payment 
on the contract was never returned or tendered by the 
Plaintiffs prior to their initiating suit for damages. The 
defendant contends that the Plaintiffs, by retaining the 
One Hundred Dollars ($100) in question, exercised their 
right under the liquidated damage clause of the earnest 
money contract and are therefore, barred from suing 
on the contract for other damages. 
In Andreason vs. Hansen, 8 Utah 2d 370, 355 P. 2d 
404, McMullin vs. Shimmin 10 U 2d 142, 349 P. 2d 720, 
Close vs. Blumenthal 11 U 2d 51, 354 P 2d 856, the 
Supreme Court of Utah established a simple but precise 
rule; a party may not sue for damages under an earnest 
money agreement and offer to purchase unless prior to the 
initiation of any such action, such party tenders return or 
actually returns all amounts which he has received pur-
suant to the contract in question. This rule is simply the 
application of the long-established rule in the field of 
damages; namely, that a party may not sue for other 
damages where the contract provides for liquidated 
damages and where the evidence indicates that com-
plainant has elected to exercise his right under the 
liquidated damages provision. 
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However, in the case at bar the facts differ slightly 
from the facts in the cases cited in that the entire amount 
of the down payment was not paid by the Defendant but 
only One Hundred Dollars ($100) of the total amount of 
Three Hundred Fifty Dollars ($350) was paid to the 
Plaintiffs and retained by them. The Plaintiffs, at trial, 
urged that the One Hundred Dollars ($100) paid by the 
Defendant to the Mt. Olympus Realty Company was in 
fact payment on a prior contract which was not at issue 
and therefore, such amount could not be considered as 
payment of the contract in question, or in the alternative, 
that the One Hunderd Dollars ($100) credited to the 
Defendant was in fact a gift by the Plaintiffs to the 
Defendant. The Plaintiffs further contended that irrespec-
tive of whether Defendant was credited with the One 
Hundred Dollars ($100) payment on the second contract, 
the entire amount of down payment was not paid and 
therefore, the Plaintiffs are not barred from initiating a 
suit for damages for loss of profit notwithstanding the 
fact that the One Hundred Dollars ($100) was retained 
by the Plaintiffs. 
To determine the validity of Plaintiffs' contention, let 
us suppose that the amount paid by the Defendant had 
been in excess of the Plaintiffs' actual loss. Would the 
Defendant be entitled to a refund of all amounts in 
excess of the actual damages arising from the breach of 
contract? Certainly the Plaintiffs would take a different 
position from the one they now take and argue that 
whatever amount paid, if any amount was in fact paid, 
would be controlled by the liquidated damages provision 
of the contract, and they would therefore be entitled to 
retain the same. 
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Here it is convenient to refer to the hypothetical 
problem so aptly stated by Justice Crockett in Andreason 
vs. Hansen, where he states: 
"\ \' e are led to wonder: Suppose the earnest 
money had been a sum far in excess of the actual 
cost; the buyer failed as here; the seller simply 
retained the money; and another sale was made 
without loss to the seller. Can it be reasonably sup-
posed that the seller would look up the first buyer 
and say: 'Here is the earnest money deposit which 
I had the option to keep as liquidated damages, 
but as I suffered no loss I now elect to return it 
to you.' This is so inconsistent with the normal 
pattern of conduct that it is not to be expected. 
"And should the first buyer ask for his money back 
it seems a foregone conclusion that he would be 
met with: 'Your earnest money was forfeited as 
liquidated damages as provided in the receipt. I 
didn't need to tell you, keeping the money mani-
fests my election to forfeit.' " 
By this statement it is obvious that the precedents 
stand for the proposition that any amount paid under the 
liquidated damages provision of a contract such as ours 
nmst be returned or at least tendered to the Defendant 
before suit is initiated and if the Plaintiff fails to do so, 
he will be barred from seeking additional damages in 
the Courts. Moreover it is obvious that upon refusal of 
the bank to honor the Defendant's check of Two Hundred 
Fifty Dollars ( $250) which was presented for payment 
by Plaintiffs or their agent, the Mt. Olympus Real Estate 
Company, Plaintiffs knew or should have known that the 
liquidated damages had been reduced to One Hundred 
Dollars ($100). Notwithstanding this fact, they elected 
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to retain the lesser amount and thereafter filed suit 
against the Defendant for damages. Had the Palintiffs 
been dissatisfied with this remedy, they could have easily 
nullified any intention of making such election by simply 
returning the One Hundred Dollars ( $1 00) prior to the 
initiation of the law suit for damages. 
Too, the pertinent language of these contracts and 
the contract presented in evidence in the case at bar, 
read, "(T) he amounts paid hereon shall, at the option of 
the seller be retained as liquidated and agreed damages" 
(line 34 and 35 of agreement) . The agreement does not 
limit the clause to amounts paid only as earnest money 
but rather uses the broad term "amounts", which would 
seem to imply that any amount paid would make the pro-
vision applicable and enforceable. The wording certainly 
substantiates the argument that the rule as laid down 
by our Supreme Court is not limited to cases where the 
exact amount of the earnest money is paid but applies 
to contracts where any amount is paid, so long as it is 
paid as "earnest money." 
Thus it would seem, and the Defendant argues, that 
the facts in the case at bar does not warrant or justify 
a deviation from the rules set out in the Andreason vs. 
Hansen case and the subsequent two cases to which 
reference has been heretofore made. 
POINT III. COURT ERRED IN THE MEASURE 
OF DAMAGES AWARDED PLAINTIFFS. 
If in fact the Plaintiffs are not barred from recover-
ing additional damages on the contract sued upon, the 
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amount of damages to be awarded them is nevertheless 
governed by the liquidated damages clause of the con-
tract, and at most, the Plaintiffs are entitled to the 
balance of the down payment. 
Here it should be emphasized that the Plaintiffs' 
retention of the One Hundred Dollars ( $100) , paid to 
them by the defendant is clear and unequivocal mani-
festation that the Plaintiffs exercised their right under the 
liquidated damage clause of the earnest money agreement. 
Thus, the Plaintiffs have in essence, agreed to substitute 
the liquidated damages for any and all actual damages 
which they may have suffered. It is stated, in McCormick 
on Damages, section 152: 
"If the Court finds that the clause in question is 
one which properly provides for liquidated dam-
ages, it fixes any recovery for damages for the 
breach at that amount. The injured party, though 
his actual damages may exceed the agreed sum, 
can recover no more, and his recovery cannot be 
diminished by showing his actual loss was less. 
This rule of law is substantiated in 15 Am fur. 264. Dam-
ages p. 697 where it states: 
"The effect of a clause for stipulated damages in a 
contract is to substitute the amount agreed upon as 
liquidated damages for the actual damages result-
ing from breach of the contract, and thereby pre-
vent a controversy between the parties as to the 
amount of damages. If a provision is construed to 
be one for liquidated damages, the amount named 
forms, in general, the measure of damages in case 
of a breach, and the recovery must be for that 
amount. No other or greater damages can be 
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awarded, even though the actual loss may be 
greater or less." 
This rule of law is the rule upon which Andreason vs. 
Hansen, McMullin vs. Shimmin and Close vs. Blumen-
thal, supra, were decided. This proposition is reaffirmed 
by Justice Henroid in his separate concurring opinion in 
Andreason vs. Hansen, where he states: 
"It was agreed that the sellers at their option could 
retain the amount advanced as liquidated damages 
if the buyers broke their promise. The buyers broke 
their promise and the sellers retained the amount 
advanced. In my opinion such retention consti-
tuted the exercise of the option and precluded 
the sellers from pursuing any other remedy. It is 
not consistent for the sellers to insist on holding 
the buyers to the terms of the contract and at the 
same time, retain the money that they agreed 
would be the measure of damages upon breach, if 
they retained it. Such inconsistency must be re-
solved against the sellers who not only furnished 
the printed contract but who had the power of 
election." 
Also, in Close vs. Blumenthal, Justice Crockett stated: 
"In regard to earnest money receipts of this char-
acter it is pertinent to observe that the attempt 
to enforce this clause of the contract is almost in-
variably against a purchaser who has been in-
duced to sign it and deposited money under the 
impression that its forfeiture will be the extent 
of his loss if he decides not to buy the property. 
And the suit is by a seller who wants to be sure 
to keep the money in hand and also seek additional 
relief. This clause is for the benefit of the seller. He 
will obviously choose the option to his advantage, 
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and to the disadvantage of the buyer. Under those 
circumstances the clause should be strictly applied 
against the seller, and he should be held to meet 
its requirements with exactness." 
In each of these cases, the Supreme Court of Utah, in 
effect, found that the Plaintiffs had exercised their right 
under the stipulated damage clause in the respective 
contracts, and the Plaintiffs had consequently agreed to 
substitute the stipulated damages for any actual damages. 
Upon this basis, our Supreme Court ruled that the Plain-
tiffs in these cases were not entitled to sue for other 
damages. 
In our case, however, it may be that the Plaintiffs 
are entitled to the balance of the down payment of Three 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ( $350) . Yet, prior to the com-
mencement of the case at bar, Plaintiffs knew that pay-
ment on the Defendant's check for Two Hundred Fifty 
Dollars ( $250) had been stopped; but Plaintiffs never-
theless elected to retain the remaining One Hundred 
Dollars ( $100) . The Plaintiffs obviously agreed to accept 
the One Hundred Dollars ($100) as liquidated damages. 
The Defendant therefore submits that the Trial Court 
erred in its determination of damages and the Plaintiffs 
are not entitled to additional damages. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant-Appellant urges that the evidence and 
testimonies presented at trial clearly indicate that One 
Hundred Dollars ( $100) was, in fact, credited to him as 
payment on the earnest money agreement sued upon and 
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that this amount was retained by Plaintiffs-Respondents 
as liquidated damages. Therefore, the Plaintiffs-Respond-
ents were barred from recovering damages in excess of 
the amount recited as stipulated damages. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KENNETH M. HISATAKE 
445 East Second South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
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